

Approved For Release 2000/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002600480009-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Peru

APR 14 10 28 AM '49

DATE DISTR. 19 apr 1949

SUBJECT Official APRA Position on Callao Revolt

NO. OF PAGES 2

25X1A6a

PLACE
ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1X6

SOURCE

1. A memorandum prepared in February 1949 by the APRA leadership presents the official Aprista position on the 3 October 1948 uprising in Callao, Peru. It traces the political situation from the election of Jose Luis Bustamante as president on 10 June 1945 up to the Callao revolt. It points out that APRA support had been decisive in Bustamante's election, but that he soon turned from the party to seek support from reactionary, anti-Aprista, pro-fascist groups. The intrigues behind the cabinet changes are discussed.
2. The party position on the celebrated case of the murder of Francisco Grana Garland on 7 January 1947 is given. Bustamante chose to pretend that this was a political crime committed by APRA, and he used this incident as an excuse to break entirely with the party. The party characterized the murder as "the typical crime of Communist provocation".
3. The memorandum also discusses the parliamentary situation during the period prior to the Callao revolt, when no meetings of the congress were held because no quorum could be obtained. The anti-APRA congressmen absented themselves so that parliament could not function, and so that the influence which APRA would exert legally through the parliament could be suppressed. The Bustamante government then acted through decrees rather than by constitutional means.
4. Vast popular discontent was created by these unconstitutional methods of Bustamante and his supporters. After careful consideration by opposition forces, it was decided that General Jose del C. Marin should head a constitutional and non-political movement against the government, the principal aims of which would be to support a constitutional government, to adopt methods to alleviate the economic crisis, and to call for general and municipal elections as soon as possible. APRA leaders agreed to give moral support to Marin's moderate movement, but they did not obligate themselves to take an active part. Marin was expected to take action about 8 October 1948.
5. At the same time, the Navy, unaware of the plans being formulated by the Army, spontaneously revolted on 3 October. The Navy's motives were similar to those of the Army, and its action was caused by a desire to bring political order to the country. APRA was surprised by the revolution of 3 October according to the memorandum, and the fact that only a few scattered Apristas took part proves that the uprising was not ordered by the party on a nationwide basis.

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6. The Directive Committee of APRA did not order intervention in the revolt because Apristas were not armed for such an undertaking. Any active intervention by the party could have caused civil war and great loss of life.
7. The Party remains today, although outlawed, the major force for political peace in Peru and the only organization capable of standing firm against the forces of Soviet totalitarianism.

Document No. 009
NO CHANGE in Class. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo. 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date: 11/18/78 By: 018

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